China’s Energy Infrastructure Development in Central Asia and Its Impact on Regional Energy Supply and Geopolitics by Xie Zhihai
construction and energy infrastructure development. 
In fact, even before the BRI, China has already started 
engaging in building energy infrastructure in the 
region since early 2000s. 
For example, as early as in 2006, China and 
Turkmenistan signed the framework agreement on 
the pipeline construction and long-term gas supply. 
This later led to the construction of the Central Asia-
China Gas Pipeline. The Central Asia-China Gas 
Pipeline includes four parallel lines (A, B C, and D) 
that run along the route Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-
Kazakhstan-China. The first line (Line A) was 
completed in 2009, and now the fourth line (Line D) 
is under construction under the BRI. By connecting 
Turkmenistan to China’s domestic grid, the natural 
gas pipeline system makes it possible to transport 
gas some 7,000 km from Turkmenistan to Shanghai. 
Also, the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) and the Kazakh oil company KazMunayGas 
jointly built the Kazakhstan–China Oil Pipeline in the 
2000s. It is also expected to be further expanded with 
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the impact of the BRI. The pipeline, running from 
Kazakhstan’s Caspian Shore to Xinjiang in China, has 
greatly facilitated the oil import from Central Asia to 
China.
Both the Central Asia-China gas and oil pipelines have 
greatly impacted energy supply in the Eurasian region. 
For example, thanks to these energy infrastructures, 
Central Asia’s energy export to China has greatly 
increased. China has also replaced Russia as the most 
influential countries in Central Asia’s energy industry. 
The map of demand and supply of energy resource 
in the Eurasian region has been greatly reshaped, 
and will continue to change under the BRI. Energy 
infrastructure could benefit both the energy suppliers 
and consumers, and thus create a win-win relationship. 
Countries should further promote the development of 
energy infrastructure. 
Although there are already some studies dealing with 
China’s energy diplomacy toward Central Asia, the 
existing literature has not paid enough attention to 
China’s energy infrastructure development in Central 
Asia. Some existing studies look at the security 
aspect of energy issue and examine the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization’s role in China-Central 
Asia energy relations (Marketos 2008; Wrobel 2014). 
Some study focuses on the energy supply and demand 
relations and claimed that China has reshaped the 
region’s energy supply through its engagement 
(Fazilov and Chen 2013). Some study argues that 
China has conducted an energy strategy towards 
Central Asia in order to compete with other countries 
such as Russia, India and Japan who are also targeting 
at energy resources in the region (Pop 2010). Some 
argues that China is re-centering Central Asia as part 
of its “new great game” in Eurasia (Chen and Fazilov 
2018). Other study examines the BRI’s new role in 
China’s energy diplomacy towards Central Asia (Liao 
2019). To summarize, most existing studies focus on 
political or geopolitical perspectives of China’s energy 
diplomacy towards Central Asia. Political scientists 
tend to overstress the significance of national strategy 
or geopolitical motives. However, the economics 
perspective is somehow missing in narrating China’s 
engagement with Central Asia for energy resources. 
Therefore, this paper tries to combine both economics 
and geopolitical perspectives to examine the relations 
between China and Central Asia centered on energy. 
So far there has been no detailed research on China’s 
energy infrastructure development in Central Asia. 
The existing studies on China’s energy diplomacy 
towards Central Asia basically focus on macro 
aspects such as national strategies or trade relations. 
In contrast, this paper tries to examine China’s energy 
engagement with Central Asia by looking into a 
micro aspect, namely, the economics concept of so-
called “energy infrastructure”. Energy infrastructure 
refers to the organizational structure that enables the 
large-scale of transportation of energy from producer 
to consumer. In this paper, specifically it means the 
oil and gas pipelines that were developed by China in 
order to transport energy from Central Asian states. 
Therefore, this paper’s core research question is that 
how China’s construction of energy infrastructure, in 
particular the oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia, has 
impacted energy supply and geopolitics in the region. 
Under such circumstances, this paper tries to elaborate 
China’s energy infrastructure development in Central 
Asia and examine its influence on energy supply and 
geopolitics in the Eurasia. In the following sections, 
the paper will first briefly review China’s investment 
in Central Asia’s energy sector, then introduce the 
traditional energy infrastructure in Central Asia and its 
limitation, and then focus on analyzing China’s energy 
infrastructure development including the construction 
of pipelines for crude oil and natural gas. After that, 
the paper will evaluate energy infrastructure’s impact 
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on energy supply and geopolitics in the region. Lastly 
the paper will exemplify the problems existing in 
China’s energy infrastructure development in Central 
Asia and raise some policy recommendations. 
2. China’s Investment in Central Asia’s 
Energy Sector
As China’s economic growth has kept a high rate in 
the past three decades, its energy demand has also 
been increasing. China’s gas consumption was 283 
billion cubic meters (Bcm) in 2018; by 2024, the 
CNPC expects it to rise by a further 130 Bcm, while 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates by a 
further 160 Bcm; and both the CNPC and the British 
Petroleum forecast China demand in 2035 of 610 
Bcm (Pirani 2019). Meanwhile, currently China has 
to depend on import from foreign countries for about 
60% of its energy demand. In 2018, China’s net gas 
imports soared by 34%, making China overtake Japan 
as the largest gas importer (Enerdata 2019). As showed 
in Table 1 and Table 2, China has become the largest 
importers of both natural gas and crude oil in 2018. 
China has long faced the so-called “Malacca 
Dilemma”, a term coined by former President Hu 
Jintao in 2003. The “Malacca Dilemma” refers to the 
situation that the Malacca Strait has become a most 
important strategic checkpoint for China’s energy 
transportation. For example, 80% of China’s energy 
import has to go through the Malacca Strait. The 
“Malacca Dilemma” shows that the Chinese leaders 
have realized the overdependence on maritime route. 
To alleviate the “Malacca Dilemma,” China has 
greatly reduced its reliance on maritime transportation 
by investing in cross border pipelines over the last 
decade, such as pipelines from Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Myanmar (Kumar and Chatnani 2018). Chinese 
policy-makers consider the land-based supply routes 
less vulnerable than the sea-lanes, where the Chinese 
navy does not have a major presence (Oh 2018). To 
tackle with its increasing energy insecurity, insure and 
diversify its energy sources, China has been actively 
conducting the so-call “energy diplomacy” towards 
energy-rich countries and developing new routes 
of energy transportation. Energy diplomacy is the 
diplomacy aiming at acquiring energy resources and 
insuring energy security by strengthening economic 
relations with other countries in energy area. Central 
Asia is one of the most important regions targeted by 
China’s “energy diplomacy.” 
It is also under such circumstances that China has 
launched the BRI in 2013. The BRI is a mega global 
strategy targeting at connecting the Eurasia by large-
scale infrastructure development. Central Asia is 
among the richest regions in oil and gas reserves. 
Since Central Asia is close to China, it becomes the 
first experiment region for the BRI projects. China’s 
official Silk Road Fund  has already invested in the 
Table 1: Natural Gas Importing Ranking in 2018
Rank Countries Natural Gas Imports in Bcm 
1 China 115.5
2 Japan 114.2
3 Germany 85.4
4 Italy 67.5
5 Republic of Korea 57.1
6 Mexico 54.3
7 Turkey 49.3
Data Source: Enerdata Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 
2019
Table 2: Crude Oil Importing Ranking in 2018
Rank Countries Crude Oil Imports(billion US $)
1 China 239.2
2 United States 163.1 
3 India 114.5
4 Japan  80.6 
Data Source: World’s Top Exports 
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Astana International Exchange, and both the China 
Development Bank and China Construction Bank 
are looking to provide lending for new infrastructure 
projects (Grant 2019). 
However, even before the BRI, China has already 
started its engagement with Central Asia, in terms 
of economic, trade and security relations. In energy 
sector, China has also long been active in investing 
in and engaging with Central Asian states. According 
to the Crude Accountability (2019), Central Asian 
countries, primarily Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan, represent a strategic interest for China’s 
energy market, as the overall volume of investment 
was greater than 70 billion dollars and accounted for 
80% of Chinese investment in the region. 
3. Traditional Energy Infrastructure in 
Central Asia 
Abundant experiences of advanced economies have 
already demonstrated that infrastructure development 
is essential to economic growth. According to Cohen 
and Grant (2018), infrastructure (and its value 
chain) is the bedrock of economic opportunity, as 
it facilitates trade, increases productivity, promotes 
knowledge sharing, and creates an environment for 
economic and even social innovation. Central Asia, 
with its important geographical position and various 
abundant energy resources, has attracted the interest 
of the international community and become a popular 
destination of foreign investments (Liu 2019). 
However, infrastructure investment in Central Asia 
is far from enough. The Asian Development Bank 
estimates investment needs of around $492 billion (or 
$565 billion including climate-related needs), or $33 
billion annually until 2030 (ADB 2017). The massive 
infrastructure requirement of Central Asia remains a 
big challenge for the region.  
As an energy-rich region, Central Asia urgently needs 
large-scale and high-quality energy infrastructure 
to take full advantage of its energy resources. For 
decades, Central Asia’s energy infrastructure remained 
underdeveloped, with producers in the region 
struggling to transform their raw natural resources 
into output, while also having difficulty finding 
reliable methods of delivery (Hart 2016). The region’s 
energy infrastructure construction was mainly from 
the legacy of the Soviet Union and later dominated by 
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The most important energy infrastructure that has 
supported the region’s energy trade in the late 20th 
Century is the Center Asia-Center Gas Pipeline. 
The Center Asia-Center Gas Pipeline runs from 
Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 
and finally reaches Russia. This pipeline system was 
first built between 1960 and 1988, with the support 
of the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, Russia then 
took charge of the energy infrastructure development 
among Central Asian states. On 12 May 2007, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev and Turkmen President Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedow together signed a memorandum 
for renovation and expansion of the western branch of 
the pipeline, which later became the Caspian Coastal 
Pipeline.
There are many problems with the traditional energy 
infrastructure in Central Asia. First of all, it was 
almost dominated by Russia, and was mainly for the 
purpose of transporting energy from Central Asia to 
Russia. However, Russia’s energy demand for Central 
Asia has continued to decline. Second, although the 
traditional energy infrastructure also helped supply oil 
and gas to Europe, there was no land route to export 
its energy eastward to East Asian economies such as 
China, Japan and Korea, whose energy demands for 
Central Asia were on the rise. Third, the Center Asia-
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Center Gas Pipeline was able to carry on natural gas 
to other countries through Russia, but there was no 
large energy infrastructure for the transportation of 
crude oil, in which Central Asia is also rich. 
Traditional energy infrastructure was outdated 
and unable to facilitate the necessity of energy 
supply within and outside the region. Under such 
circumstances, China made its policy-decision to 
cooperate with Central Asian countries to develop 
new energy infrastructure, not only to expand its 
energy trade with the region, but also to help better 
organize energy distribution within the region.
4. China’s Energy Infrastructure 
Development in Central Asia 
4.1 China and Energy Infrastructure in Central Asia
China has invested in three categories of infrastructure 
development in Central Asia, including transport, 
energy, and information and communication 
technology (ICT). Among the three, energy 
infrastructure is among the most successful projects 
that China has long involved so far. After the launch 
of the BRI, transportation infrastructure such as the 
high-speed rail projects has also attracted people’s 
attention. But its effect still remains to be seen, as 
China’s high-speed rail construction in Central Asia as 
well as other regions has just started in recent years. 
In contrast, energy infrastructure development in the 
region has already made considerable achievements. 
Relatively China entered Central Asia’s energy market 
later than Russia and western countries. In 1997 
when the CNPC acquired the rights to the Aktobe 
field in Kazakhstan, China for the first time started 
its energy development in the region. Since then, 
energy infrastructure development has also become 
the top agenda for China’s “energy diplomacy” 
towards Central Asia. As China and its state-owned 
energy companies continue to strengthen the energy 
nexus with the region, it also started to increase its 
presence in construction of energy infrastructure 
through collaboration with Central Asian states and 
local energy companies. 
From late 1990s, China has become active in negotiating 
with Central Asian states, bilaterally or multilaterally, 
to acquire the right to bid for large-scale energy 
infrastructure. The prime example of a cross-border 
energy infrastructure project being used to advance 
geopolitical objectives is China’s BRI, launched by 
President Xi Jinping in 2013 (Oh 2018). Chinese 
companies are involved in upstream, midstream and 
downstream activities in oil and gas sectors. Midstream 
activities consist of building infrastructure linking 
China with supply sources, as well as addressing oil 
and gas infrastructure development needs within the 
host countries (IEA 2019). 
Political support is one important factor behind the 
success of China’s energy infrastructure development 
in Central Asia. For example, both China’s former 
President Hu Jintao and current President Xi Jinping 
have visited Central Asia a number of times during 
their terms. The biggest achievements of China’s 
energy infrastructure development are the two mega 
crude oil and natural gas pipelines, the Kazakhstan-
China Oil Pipeline and the Central Asia-China Gas 
Pipeline. In the following sections, the paper will 
focus on analyzing the two infrastructure projects and 
examining their impact on regional and inter-regional 
energy supply and geopolitics. 
4.2 The Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline
Kazakhstan had the potential to become Central Asia’s 
largest crude oil supplier to China. Kazakhstan’s 
total proven offshore and onshore oil fields’ reserves 
constitute about 37 billion barrels of oil and 3.3 trillion 
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cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas, making Kazakhstan 
one of the world’s major oil producers with the 
potential to expand the production of 2 million bbl/
day in 2010 to 3.5 million bbl/day by 2015 (Chen and 
Fazilov 2018).
In September 1997, the CNPC and KazMunayGas, 
a Kazakh company, signed the memorandum of 
understanding to build the oil pipeline between 
Kazakhstan and China. Since then, the project was 
delayed for quite some years. It was then President 
Hu Jintao’s first visit to Kazakhstan in June 2003 that 
reconfirmed China’s commitment to the oil pipeline 
construction. After that, the agenda of building the 
oil pipeline speeded up with full support from the 
Chinese government. 
China and Kazakhstan have considered three 
opportunities: the first is to prolong the existing 
pipeline between cities of Uzbekistan-Bukhara and 
Tashkent to Almaty, then through Taldikorgan to 
Alashankou; the second is the construction of a new 
gas pipeline connecting Ishim (western Siberia) and 
Alashankou and the one going through Astana and 
Karaganda; and the third is a variant of constructing 
a pipeline from Shalkar (western Kazakhstan) and 
one coming through Kizilorda until Shimkent, with 
connection to the pipeline Bukhara-Tashkent-Almaty 
(Fazilov and Chen 2013). Finally China and the 
Kazakhstan agreed on the construction of a new oil 
pipeline from Kazakhstan’s Caspian Shore to Xinjiang 
in China. China and Kazakhstan have invested $700 
million for the project, while the total cost of building 
the pipeline was estimated at $3 billion.
The Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline has three phases. 
The first phase between Atyrau and Kenkiyak, of 448 
kilometers length, was completed in 2003; the second 
phase, between Atasu to Alashankou in China, with 
the length of 988 kilometers, has been functioning 
since July 2006; and the third phase, from Kenkiyak 
to Kumkol, with the length of 793 kilometers, was 
finished in July 2009 (Pop 2010). Since then, there 
have been some new expansion of the routes, making 
the pipeline’s total length reach 2,800 kilometers, 
called “the first pipeline of the new silk road” by the 
Chinese government. Crude oil first arrives at the 
Dushanzi Oil and Natural Company at Alashankou, 
a branch of the CNPC, and then is shipped to the 
domestic market of China.  
In 2019 alone, the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline 
transported over 10.88 million tonnes crude oil to 
China, adding its accumulated shipping amount to 
130 million tons since its inauguration in 2006 (China 
State Council 2020). Kazakhstan and China had 
expected to transport 10 million tonnes of crude oil 
annually and to increase the annual oil transportation 
amount to 20 million tonnes by 2010. However, this 
turned to be unrealistic. The shipping amount did 
keep rising during the first several years. As shown in 
Table 3, since 2010, the annual amount has remained 
slightly over 10 million tonnes, but never made 
significant increase.
The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline now pumps 
130,000 barrels per day from the Caspian Shore to 
the western China, and energy trade between three 
Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan) and China supplies with 15% of its 
Table 3: Crude Oil to China through Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline (in million tonnes)
Year 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
Crude Oil Carried to China 7.77 10.93 11.85 10.85 12.3 10.88
Data Source: National Energy Administration of China; Energy News.
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natural gas needs (Grant 2019). Kazakhstan plans to 
increase oil exports to China to 6-7 million tonnes 
a year from just 1 million tonnes at the expense of 
shipments to Europe, starting from the second half of 
2020, according to its Deputy Energy Minister Aset 
Magauov (Reuters 2019).  
4.3 The Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline 
The Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline is also known 
as the Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline. It starts 
from Turkmenistan and runs through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan to reach Xinjiang in China. 
The construction of the Center Asia-China Gas 
Pipeline started in 2009, with China’s robust diplomacy 
towards Central Asian countries. In December 2009, 
then President Hu Jintao of China visited the Kazakh 
capital Astana. With then Kazakhstan President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, he joined the ceremony to 
inaugurate the Kazakh stretch of the Central Asia-
China Gas Pipeline. “It’s a huge project that will one 
day restore the ancient Silk Road route,” Nazarbayev 
told Hu in Astana, referring to a mediaeval 
network of trading routes that ran across Eurasia 
(Nurshayeva and Zhumatov 2009). On 14 December, 
2009, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov of 
Turkmenistan hosted Chinese President Hu Jintao, 
Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev and 
Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov at a remote 
natural gas field in the eastern part of Turkmenistan 
for the inauguration of a 1,800-kilometer pipeline that 
connects all four countries and will transport 40 Bcm 
of gas annually when it reaches its ultimate capacity, 
which marked a turning point in the two-decade saga 
of bringing Central Asian oil and gas to international 
markets after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Chow 
and Hendrix 2010).
The Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline consists of four 
lines, called Line A, Line B, Line C and Line D. In 
2012, Line A and Line B were completed. Uzbekistan 
started to supply natural gas through the Central Asia-
China Gas Pipeline in August 2012. After that, the 
construction of Line C that paralleled Lines A and 
B was also launched and completed in 2013, which 
increased the total capacity of the pipeline to 55 Bcm 
a year, approximately 20% of China’s annual natural 
gas consumption (Cohen and Grant 2018). 
China also signed memoranda of understanding with 
all the parties along the route of Line D - Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan - in September 
2013. At the same time, a preliminary agreement was 
reached on to raise Chinese imports of Turkmen gas 
to 85 Bcm/year. A groundbreaking ceremony was 
held in Tajikistan in 2014, and a joint venture was 
established between the CNPC and Uzbekneftegaz 
to build the Uzbek section. According to the Orient 
News (2020), a Terkmen news media, Line D will be 
commissioned into operation in late 2020. However, 
due to COVID-19, the construction agenda might 
have been delayed. With the completion of the fourth 
line (Line D), which will transit Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, annual gas export capacity from the 
pipeline will reach 85 Bcm (Cohen and Grant 2018).
How does the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline 
change the supply of natural gas in Central Asia?  For 
example, by 2007, about 92% of Central Asia’s gas 
went through Russia, most via the Central Asia-Center 
Gas Pipeline, the traditional energy infrastructure in 
the region (ICG 2007). As Pirani (2019) argues, the gas 
sectors of countries in Central Asia have traditionally 
been of interest because of their connection to Russia, 
but over the past decade this link has increasingly 
become less relevant as exports to China have started 
to dominate. The major supplier of natural gas for 
all lines of the Central Asia – China Gas Pipeline 
is Turkmenistan. With the operation of the Central-
Asia-China Gas Pipeline, more than half of Turkmen 
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natural gas exports are delivered to China through this 
route, no need to go through the Central Asia-Center 
Gas Pipeline anymore. 
China now relies on the Central Asia-China Gas 
Pipeline for about 15% of its natural gas import, and 
this percentage might continue to rise in the future. 
With a total length of 1,833 km and a designed annual 
gas transmission capacity of 60 billion cubic meters 
per year, the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline has 
been operating stably and safely for about ten years. 
According to PetroChina West Pipeline Company, the 
Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline delivered over 47.9 
Bcm of natural gas to China in 2019, and as of Dec 
31, 2019, 294.6 Bcm of natural gas had been imported 
via the pipeline since it was put into operation in 
December 2009, benefiting over 500 million people 
in 27 provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, 
and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(China Daily 2020).
5. The Energy Infrastructure’s Impact 
on Energy Supply and Geopolitics
5.1 Impact on China’s Energy Engagement in 
Central Asia 
For China, the energy infrastructure development in 
Central Asia symbolizes the orientation change in its 
energy policy. Political instability in the Middle East 
and the “Malacca Dilemma” deteriorate China’s energy 
security situation. With its security problems, the need 
to diversify its energy suppliers, and the necessity 
to develop the northwest China, all these factors 
determined the reorientation of China’s foreign energy 
policy towards Central Asia (Pop 2010). Currently the 
Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, Kazakhstan-China 
Gas Pipeline and Central Asia-China gas pipeline are 
the three major transit routes of Chinese hydrocarbon 
imports from Central Asia (Wang 2015). Although 
China still relies a lot on the Middle East for its fossil 
energy, the percentage of energy import from the 
Central Asia has seen significant increase. This trend 
will continue, as the BRI will definitely expand the 
existing energy infrastructure in the region to connect 
not only China with Central Asia, but also the whole 
Eurasia. 
Also, China’s investment in Central Asia has 
been expanded with the development of energy 
infrastructure in the region. By April 2017, China 
had invested in $304.9 billion worth of contracts 
with its partners in Central Asia, in sectors including 
transport, communication, energy infrastructure, 
financial linkages, technology transfer and trade 
facilitation (Miankhel 2019). The Kazakhstan-China 
Oil Pipeline project was a 50:50 joint venture of the 
KazMunayGas and the CNPC, though the CNPC paid 
over 85% of the $800 million cost (ICG 2007).
Nowadays, the major China energy players in the 
region are the CNPC, China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) and Petro China, 
which all have partnered with local companies to 
compete with traditional power players like Russia 
and multinational companies such as Chevron, 
ExxonMobile, and BP in the exploration and extraction 
of oil and natural gas (Fazilov and Chen, 2013). In 
particular, the CNPC has been very active in engaging 
with gas pipeline construction and expansion. The 
CNPC has also begun building spurs from that 
main line not only to the major energy producers of 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but also to 
energy-poor Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan 
(Petersen 2013).
China and the Central Asian countries have also 
developed flexible and effective collaboration for the 
development and operation of energy infrastructure. 
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For example, in building the Central Asia-China 
Gas Pipeline, Asia Trans Gas, a joint venture of 
Uzbekneftegas and the CNPC, and Asian Gas 
Pipeline Company, a joint venture of the CNPC and 
KazMunayGas were established. In building the 
Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, MunaiTas, a joint 
venture between the CNPC and KazMunayGas, was 
also established. Such examples could also provide 
significant experiences and know-how for the 
transnational energy infrastructure development in 
other region. 
5.2 Impact on Energy Supply in Central Asia 
There is no doubt that energy infrastructure developed by 
China, in particular the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline 
and Center Asia-China Gas Pipeline in Central Asia, 
has great impact on energy supply and geopolitics in 
the region. First of all, energy infrastructure has helped 
Central Asian states to transport their crude oil and gas 
much more easily to China to meet its soaring energy 
demand and support its rapid economic development. 
In 2018, state-owned KazTransGas signed a five-year 
export deal to deliver up to 1.0 billion cubic feet per 
day of natural gas (10 Bcm per year) to China. The 
IEA has estimated that China may be importing up to 
50% of the region’s oil and gas by 2020, signaling a 
decisive shift in Central Asia’s energy flow from the 
west to the east (Hart 2016).
How does the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline change 
energy supply in Central Asia? In Kazakhstan’s case, 
by 2007, about 84% of its oil exports pass through 
Russia to market (ICG 2007). With the operation of the 
Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, its oil can be directly 
exported to the Chinese market. In addition, Russia’s 
oil is also exported to China through Kazakhstan. As 
Yin Taijun, then Vice CEO of the CNPC International 
Ltd. pointed out, the operation of the Kazakhstan-
China Oil Pipeline did not only supply reliable and 
secure source of oil import to China, but also provided 
new stable oil export markets for Kazakhstan and 
Russia (China State Council 2006). 
For example, the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline 
does not only transport crude oil from Kazakhstan, 
but also from Russia to China. Russian companies 
such as TNK-BP and Gazprom Neft are also making 
use of the pipeline built by China. Although energy 
infrastructure has been greatly improved in the 
Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, 
energy supply still cannot meet the roaring energy 
demand from China. Part of the reason is that Western 
European countries still remain large markets for 
Central Asia’s energy export. For example, the crude 
oil from Kazakhstan only account for 4% of China’s 
oil import. Therefore, to improve the efficiency of 
the energy infrastructure in Central Asia, countries 
outside the region should be encouraged to make 
use of it. The Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline has an 
annual load capacity of 20 million tonnes. However, 
currently about only half of the amount of crude oil 
has been shipped to China annually (China Ministry 
of Commerce 2013). 
5.3 Impact on Geopolitical Competition in 
Central Asia  
The importance of both Central Asia and China’s 
global energy status has also been changed by such 
large-scale oil and gas pipelines. Central Asia enjoys 
the strategically important status due to its energy and 
geopolitical position. Central Asian energy insecurity 
illustrates the impact of geopolitics on the regulation 
of energy markets, and the region is strategically 
located in Russia’s sphere of influence and along 
China’s New Silk Road (Boute 2019). Then what 
does Central Asia mean for China? In the long run, 
China eyes Central Asia as the strategic crossroad for 
its long land route to trade with the Gulf and Europe; 
in the short term, China needs to quell its thirst for 
Central Asia’s oil and gas that can be brought overland 
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to power its factories on the eastern seaboard (Fazilov 
and Chen 2013). 
Lying on some of the world’s biggest oil, gas and 
metals reserves, Central Asia is at the center of a 
geopolitical tug-of-war between Russia, China and 
the West, all seeking to grab a share of its untapped 
riches (Gurt 2009). During the past ten years, China 
has gradually won the competition against Russia and 
the West, through the strategic development of large-
scale energy infrastructure in the region. With China’s 
increasing presence in Central Asia’s energy sector, it 
will inevitably face competition with Russia and other 
Western countries who traditionally have more national 
interest of energy and geopolitics in Central Asia. 
The two mega projects have dominated the energy 
infrastructure landscape in Central Asia and have thus 
made China dominate the trade of energy resources in 
the region. The energy corridors will ultimately place 
China in the center of a “Pan-Asian global energy 
bridge”, which will link existing and potential suppliers 
including Persian Gulf countries, Central Asia and 
Russia to major energy consumers including China, 
Japan and Korea (Fazilov and Chen 2013).
The strategic competition between Russia and China 
has tilted to China. Historically, the persistence of 
Soviet influence over Central Asia’s energy sector led 
to the majority of Caspian oil and gas to flow north to 
Russia, and from there onward to the industrialized 
consumer countries of Western Europe (Hart 2016). 
However, as China enlarges its energy infrastructure 
development and enhances its influence in energy 
sector in the region, the situation has changed 
significantly. In April 2009, a suspicious explosion 
in the main Russia-Turkmenistan pipeline allowed 
Moscow to cut its annual contractual intake of gas 
from Turkmenistan from around 50 Bcm, to around 
10 Bcm (World Politics Review 2018). This marked 
a significant turning point from when China started 
to catch up with Russia. China now has replaced 
Russia as the biggest energy trader with most Central 
Asian states. Russia is even relying on the energy 
infrastructure, both the crude oil and natural gas 
pipelines, built by China in the region to transport 
and export its own energy resources. China’s growing 
economic presence clearly comes at Russia’s expense 
and it is now the biggest trading partner of every 
Central Asian country except Kazakhstan (World 
Politics Review 2018).
For Central Asian states, the energy infrastructure 
has also brought them huge geopolitical interests. 
Western reliance on Middle Eastern oil has long 
dominated global energy industry, yet the rapid 
development of Central Asia’s energy infrastructure 
has made it a region that finally looks ready to fulfill 
its potential in delivering the burgeoning energy needs 
of Eurasia (Hart 2016). Central Asian states have been 
embracing China’s BRI, while some western countries 
are still suspicious about it. With positive response to 
the BRI and active cooperation with China, Central 
Asian states are trying to re-direct their energy 
supply. By doing so, they expect to reap significant 
developing opportunities brought by the BRI and 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
However, these states should not only focus on their 
energy markets, but also look at the development of 
substantial industrial sectors with the help of China. 
6. Problems of China’s Energy 
Infrastructure Development in 
Central Asia
6.1 Over-dependence on China 
Central Asian states are increasingly depending on 
China. Taking Kazakhstan as an example, initially 
Chinese investments were welcomed to counter-
balance perceived Russian and US influence in the 
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region and to allow Kazakhstan to diversify its trading 
partners away from dependence on Russia which 
historically has been the leading trading partner with 
the country; but with China holding more and more 
assets in the country, the influence of China over 
Kazakhstan is becoming an impediment (Malhotra 
2012). Chinese oil companies off-take is anywhere 
between 25-30% of Kazakhstan’s oil output.  Now 
Central Asian countries are perceiving more and more 
threats from China because its increasing influence 
over the resource of Central Asia might disturb 
the autonomous decision making power of these 
countries. For example, a survey in 2017 showed that 
37% of responders in Kyrgyzstan considered China as 
the greatest economic threat (Karibayeva 2020). 
6.2 Environmental Concern 
According to the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), many of the 
infrastructure projects planned and under construction 
in the region do not yet fully support countries’ long-
term development and climate objectives (OECD 
2019). In the energy and industry sectors, projects 
tend to perpetuate the status quo, increasing the 
Central Asia’s dependency on fossil fuel and mineral 
extraction and limiting economic diversification, and 
investment in technologies compatible with long-term 
de-carbonization pathways (e.g. renewable energy) 
remains marginal (OECD 2019). 
It is worth noting that the China-led AIIB has 
approved a $46.7-million loan for the construction 
and operation of a 100-megawatt wind power plant in 
southern Kazakhstan which, when completed, will be 
the largest in Central Asia (AIIB 2019). Although this 
investment is under the framework of the AIIB, this 
might imply that China has realized the importance 
of infrastructure development for renewable energy in 
Central Asia. 
6.3 Unbalanced Investment among Sectors 
China’s investment in Central Asia has basically 
focused on infrastructure, which does help Central 
Asian countries a lot. However, China has invested 
not that much in the development of substantial 
economic sectors to boost the growth of Central Asian 
economy. It is estimated that about 90% of exports 
from Central Asia to China are fuel and raw materials. 
Without development of substantial economic sectors 
in Central Asia, the function of energy and other 
infrastructure will not be fully made use of. This 
should be the next important step for China and 
developed countries to take in Central Asia. With 
and via the BRI, China is potentially capable of 
reshaping Central Asia’s economic potential through 
reorganizing and expanding ties with the latter (Chen 
and Fazilov 2018).
6.4 Bad Governance of Energy Systems 
Energy sector, like other sectors in Central Asia, 
faces the problem of bad governance. As Boute 
(2019) pointed out in his book on energy law and 
geopolitics in Central Asia, the region holds huge 
energy reserves, but its energy systems are highly 
inefficient and unreliable, and thus require urgent 
reform. However, endemic corruption, discrimination 
and the strong centralization of power have so far 
blocked initiatives to reorganize energy supply. The 
support to help Central Asian countries transparently 
manage and operate the energy projects invested by 
China is also urgently needed.  
6.5 The Trap of Energy Curse 
Energy curse is another problem for Central Asia. 
Energy curse refers to the fact that many countries 
with abundant energy resources tend to just rely on 
the resources and thus have low level of economic 
development and industrialization. The three oil 
and gas producers in the region – Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – are showing signs of 
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the “resource curse” under which energy-rich nations 
fail to thrive or develop distorted, unstable economies 
(ICG 2007). How to encourage Central Asian 
countries to not rely too much on its resources, but 
to diversify its sources of economic growth remains 
a big challenge. 
7. Conclusion 
Even before the BRI, China has started to embark on 
energy infrastructure development in Central Asia. 
The two typical large-scale energy infrastructure 
projects, the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline and the 
Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, which were built 
by China in the 2000s, have great impact on regional 
energy supply and geopolitics in Central Asia. 
The mega energy infrastructure projects have not only 
changed the landscape of energy supply and demand, 
but also significantly influenced geopolitics in the 
region. Firstly, China’s engagement in the region has 
been strengthened through the energy infrastructure. 
The oil and gas pipelines have greatly increased 
the energy trade between China and Central Asian 
countries. Secondly, with the large-scale energy 
infrastructure, China has gradually dominated the 
energy supply in the region, which made Central 
Asian countries depend on China more and more. 
Lastly, regional geopolitical competition between 
China and Russia over energy resources has also been 
impacted by the energy infrastructure built by China. 
Traditional energy infrastructure made by Russia gave 
way to China-made energy infrastructure. Russia’s 
dominant influence in the region has also been 
replaced by China. Even Russia itself is making use 
of the China-made energy infrastructure to transport 
its energy to China. 
However, there also exist many worries and concerns 
with China’s increasing presence in the region’s 
energy sector. Under the BRI, Central Asian countries 
are depending on China more than ever before. The 
Central Asia countries might need to rethink their 
over-dependency on China and the trap of energy 
curse. In addition to traditional energy resources such 
as oil and gas, they should also rely on renewable 
energy and other substantial economic sector for a 
sustainable and comprehensive strategy of economic 
development.  
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